Bryant introduces
his theory of onticology, the idea that objects are the only type of being.
This equalizes subjects and objects in a “democracy of things” while
introducing a subjectless object, an object not defined by its relation to, or
representation by the subject. In order to put this into action, Bryant states
one must redraw distinctions between subject and object, decenter the human and
refuse to reduce objects to “vehicles of content and signs”. But before getting
to his point, Bryant provides examples of previous theories about what can be
known of objects, how we think about objects and what objects actually are,
their “true reality”.
When we
think about objects, we draw distinctions based on its relation to a subject,
its “representation”. By stating there are distinctions between subjects and
objects, we create a world of subject and culture as well as a separate world
of nature and object. The overlap between these two worlds is a subject’s
representation of an object. This raises the question: can we know the true
nature of an object’s reality outside of our own distorted representations (or
perception) of it? Do the worlds of subject and object actually overlap or is
the object represented within the world of subject?
Bryant
provides two theories that attempt to answer this question: anti-realisms and
epistemological realisms. Epistemological realism argues that true
representations exist independent of subject and culture representations. For
example, if a tree falls in a forest, it makes a sound regardless of if there
is someone there to observe the sound. Anti realism argues that our
representations are social constructions and do not reflect the true reality of
an object. The tree falls and makes a sound but the observation of the sound is
socially constructed. This raises the question: is the reality of an object
knowable, or accessible by the human mind? This is a question of epistemology,
how we know an object. But Bryant argues that questions of ontology, the being
of an object are vastly more important.
Bryant
introduces an opposing theory to epistemological realism: ontological realism,
the idea that objects exist independent of human existence. Objects are not
what our access to objects gives us. Bryant furthers this with his theory of
onticology. Humans/subjects are not opposed to, or other than objects but are
objects themselves. Humans are a type of object, not superior or separate in
any way. Bryant provides a contrasting distinction to the separate worlds of
subject and object by introducing collectives. Collectives include all objects
in one world, a world of the “democracy of things”.
Bryant’s article explains some of
these concepts in very convoluted ways. Without well defined terms, sections of
the article (the top of 138 in CP for instance) can be quite difficult to
follow.
“Translation
is not unique to how the mind relates to the world. And as a consequence of
this, no objet has direct access to any other object.” (CP 143). These types of philosophical arguments are
often paradoxical in nature. They raise questions about whether one can truly
know anything at all.
Bryant argues, “That it is necessary to staunchly defend the
autonomy of objects… refusing any reduction of objects to their relations” (CP
143). This can be an obstacle to
communication, after all what is this blog post if not a reduction and relation
of the text itself?
Consider the following:
1.
Bryant’s use of diagrams was helpful in visualizing
the concepts on pages 131-32, however, the diagrams on pages 137-39 didn’t help
nearly as much. What are your thoughts on the diagrams?
2.
Is there any pragmatic application for the
notion of the unknowability of objective reality? Is it not contradictory to
our nature to deny us our natural role as the subject? Are our objectifications
always unfair, in both animate and
inanimate objects?
Thank you
-Michaela Ware, Lynn Okon, Wesley
Armstrong
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